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1 The theory of expansionary austerity (eat) and its critiques: An overview
Expansionary austerity theory (EAT hereinafter) is part of a long-standing economic
debate about the effectiveness of fiscal policy. Nonetheless, EAT as we currently know
it emerged at the beginning of the 1990s. Most of the contributions in this strand of
literature are empirical works based on some specific case studies (see Giavazzi and
Pagano 1990; 1996; Perotti 2013) or larger cross-country data samples (see Alesina and
Perotti 1995; 1997; Alesina and Ardagna 2010; 2012; Alesina et al. 2015). They adopt
an inductive methodology, trying to validate a more general, supposedly universal,
theory starting from the observation of a more or less timely and geographically
delimited empirical evidence. EAT is characterized by four main postulates:
1. At least under certain circumstances, discretionary expansionary fiscal policies can
induce economic contractions rather than expansions. In particular, this can happen
when fiscal expansions generate quite large fiscal deficits, which in turn can
impinge upon the solidity of public finances and cause an increase in interest rates.
This non-Keynesian outcome of expansionary fiscal measures gets even more
likely in the presence of an already high level of the public debt stock.1
2. Symmetrically, fiscal consolidations can prompt economic expansions, even in the
short run and even in the midst of a recession, by squeezing public deficits,
reducing the public debt stock, and creating the expectations for a more solid
macroeconomic environment. In order to do so, however, fiscal consolidations
must be well-designed. Not only the overall fiscal stance, but also the composition
of specific fiscal measures matter.
3. A well-designed fiscal consolidation plan is based on a mix of deep, persistent and
credible cuts in public expenditures then possibly followed by a reduction in taxes.
According to Alesina and Perotti (1997), expenditure cuts in successful fiscal
consolidations (“type-1 adjustments” in the jargon of the authors) “rely primarily
on cuts in transfers, social security, government wages, and employment”, whilst
“tax increases are a small fraction of the total adjustment, and, in particular, taxes
on households are not raised at all or are even reduced” (Alesina and Perotti 1997,
p.211). This type of well-designed, supposedly expansionary, fiscal retrenchment is
to be preferred to likely contractionary “type-2 adjustments”, which “rely mostly
on broad-based tax increases, and often the largest increases are in taxes on
households and social security contributions” (Alesina and Perotti 1997, p.211).2
1 See Sutherland (1997) for the case of possible non-Keynesian effects of expansionary fiscal measures when
undertaken in a context of high public debt. Perotti (2013) also stresses that fiscal contractions may be
expansionary in the presence of high interest rates, especially when they contribute to reducing risk premia on
financial assets and prompt a considerable reduction in nominal interest rates, particularly with respect to
government bonds.
2 Alesina and Perotti (1997) also stress that spending cuts matched with (expected) reductions in household
taxes may lead to expansionary outcomes by reducing workers’ wage claims, by inducing wage moderation,
and hence by increasing the external competitiveness of domestically produced goods.
A. Botta
4. There are three channels through which a well-designed fiscal consolidation
package can release expansionary outcomes. First, upfront public spending cuts
can constitute a sign of a regime change that can positively affect the behavior of
private economic actors, especially households, through the “expectation channel”.
Households can be induced to form optimistic expectations by anticipating future
tax reductions and consequent increases in their own (permanent) income. This, in
turn, may incentivize them to raise consumption immediately, giving momentum
to current economic activity. Second, a “financial channel” is to be taken into
account. Tough fiscal corrections that prove to be effective in reducing public
deficit and the public debt stock can stimulate investment and growth by
reestablishing bond vigilantes’ trust in the solvency of public finances and
prompting a significant reduction in interest rates. Third, an “export-led channel”
may be at work. Cuts in public wages can establish a climate of wage moderation
in the labor market, and engineer an internal devaluation of the real exchange rate.
Thus, this can boost exports and ultimately growth. It goes without saying that this
last channel is of particular relevance in countries adopting a fixed exchange rate
regime or a supranational currency such as in eurozone member states.
The vast majority of the existing critiques of EAT have addressed the several
shortcomings of the econometric techniques adopted by EAT supporters in order to
validate their theoretical propositions empirically (see Guajardo et al. 2011; Baker and
Rosnick 2014). The aim of this paper is different, since that it focuses on theory and
aims at enquiring the logical solidity of EAT through a simple analytical post-
Keynesian/evolutionist model. More in detail, we intend to scrutinize two crucial
propositions at the heart of EAT’s policy proposal.
1. First, we critically investigate the assertion by Alberto Alesina, according to which
“many even sharp reductions of budget deficits have been accompanied and
immediately followed by sustained growth rather than recessions even in the very
short run” (Alesina 2010, p.3). We perform such analysis in the short-run part of
our model through two distinguished (for the sake of clarity) policy exercises. First,
we detect whether a well-designed discretionary cut in public transfers followed by
an expected reduction of taxes on households’ income effectively increases the
level of economic activity. Second, we test the logical soundness of the “expecta-
tion channel” by looking at the macroeconomic outcomes of a cut in the public
sector’s wages and, hence, of a EAT-type internal devaluation. We end up arguing
that EAT theoretical foundations are extremely fragile. By no means can even a
well-designed fiscal contraction easily conduct economic expansions. On the
contrary, EAT’s economic mechanisms are rather weak and state- and institution-
al-contingent, to say the least.
2. Second, we critically discuss the more recent idea that fiscal consolidations may
imply short-term costs, but lead to far larger long-run benefits in the form of sound
public finances and revived economic activity (see Section 3 on this point). We
perform our analysis in the long-run part of the model by looking at some long-run
dynamics possibly set in motion by austerity measures. We conclude noting that
austerity-led short-run costs and long-run benefits are likely inconsistent. Even
mild short-run recessionary responses to adjustment programs can give rise to
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instable evolutions in the public debt-to-GDP ratio, so that the short-run costs of
austerity measures may eventually breed even larger long-run damages (rather than
benefits).
Our model blends together the post-Keynesian and evolutionary/institutionalist
traditions. From the post-Keynesian tradition, we take the demand-driven logic
that permeates the functioning of our model. Moreover, we pay attention to the
importance that mounting Keynesian-type radical uncertainty after the eruption of
the global financial crisis and sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone may play in
shaping economic actors’ expectations and behaviors. According to the evolution-
ary approach to system dynamics (Radzicki and Sterman 1994), we describe an
economy in which cumulative mechanisms give rise to path dependence and
multiple equilibria. We also put emphasis on the crucial role that country-
specific institutions play in shaping diverging economic trajectories. We note that
austerity may lead to different outcomes depending on the specific “monetary
environment” in which it is implemented. Whilst the short-run expansionary
outcomes of austerity hardly emerge in monetarily sovereign and non–monetarily
sovereign countries alike, the way central banks intervene to stop financial distress
proves to be a decisive factor in taming or feeding long-run macroeconomic
instability. In the case of non–monetarily sovereign countries, in the absence of
any deep institutional discontinuity, debt forgiveness may eventually stand out as
the ultimate solution for restoring economic soundness. This fact notwithstanding,
changes in monetary institutions’ commitments taking place in the eurozone since
mid-2012 show that economic variables and institutional factors often co-evolve in
response to existing economic problems. Such an endogenous institutional change
may eventually give rise to structural breakthroughs and set new and much more
stable dynamics.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the short-run part of our
model and analyzes the effects of allegedly well-designed consolidation packages on
economic activity and on the deficit-to-GDP ratio. Section 3 moves to the long run and
shows how fiscal variables (and eventually economic institutions) may (co-)evolve as a
consequence of (and perhaps in reaction to) the short-run effects assessed before.
Section 4 concludes.
2 Short-run expansionary/contractionary effects of fiscal adjustments
in a simple open economy
Post-Keynesian and evolutionary macro models always paid attention to the relevance
of expansionary fiscal measures as useful policy tools for both short-run economic
stabilization and long-run economic development. Nonetheless, interest in this topic
has recently been renewed perhaps as a response to mainstream economists’ post-crisis
concern about the allegedly detrimental effects on economic growth of a too high
public debt (see Reinhart and Rogoff 2010).
For instance, You and Dutt (1996) propose a post-Keynesian model in which they
track the short-run and long-run effects of public expenditures and public debt accu-
mulation on economic growth and income distribution. They find that a long-run
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increase in public debt stimulates growth by increasing interest incomes of bonds’
holders, hence their consumption expenditures.3 Moreover, they also stress that larger
fiscal deficits may be conducive to faster growth and lower income inequality if higher
capacity utilization and higher employment rates raise workers’ income more than
capitalists/rentiers’ do (due to increasing interest payments on a rising public debt
stock). These findings remain valid in Dutt (2013), even though the author “makes a
concession to orthodox economic thinking” (Dutt 2013, p.109) by allowing for a
possible crowing-out effect of public debt on private investment. This is due to the
fact that the expansionary effects of public expenditures, in particular, the crowding-in
impact of public investment on private ones, are still at work, with positive conse-
quences on economic activity, productivity dynamics and the growth rate of labor
productivity. Eventually, these positive short- and long-run outcomes of fiscal expan-
sions can more than compensate for any possible negative impact an increasing public
debt may induce on entrepreneurs’ will to invest.
Interestingly, You and Dutt (1996), Dutt (2013), as well as Leao (2013) also find that
public debt dynamics can be stable and reach a steady-state (as a ratio of capital stock
or GDP) even in the presence of a fiscal deficit, thanks to the abovementioned
expansionary effects of a “larger” public sector. These results are confirmed by
Godley and Lavoie (2007) and Ryoo and Skott (2013) in the context of full-fledged
SFC models. In particular, Godley and Lavoie (2007) claim that the stability of the
debt-to-GDP ratio can be preserved, even in the presence of interest rates higher than
the GDP growth rates, without necessarily running a public budget surplus. Once again,
this result stems from the fact that debt accumulation (as a ratio of GDP) can be self-
stabilizing, since that its own growth also raises private sector’s wealth and income
(through interest payments), this way increasing consumption, GDP and tax revenues.
In Hein (2016), such Keynesian-type expansionary effects of a higher growth rate of
public expenditures give rise to a “paradox of debt”: an increase in primary government
deficits gives rise to a fall in the long-run stable public debt-output ratio.
All the above-mentioned works address the general topic of the effects of public debt
accumulation on short- and long-run economic dynamics. Nevertheless, they do not
directly and specifically criticize the crucial EAT’s claims reported in the introduction
of this paper. A number of other contributions try to do this. Boyer (2012), for example,
surveys the very specific conjunctures under which austerity measures might have been
expansionary in a few small open economies in the past. Nevertheless, Boyer does not
provide any formal treatment of his critique. Palley (2010) elaborates a post-Keynesian
closed-economy model showing the short-run effects of fiscal rules imposing limits to
the debt-to-GDP ratio. Dosi et al. (2015) extend Palley’s analysis through an evolu-
tionary model featuring complex micro-macro interactions, and in which fiscal rules
also entail long-run economic implications by affecting R&D efforts and technology
progress. Finally, Foresti and Marani (2014) propose a simple short-run model in which
austerity may have expansionary outcomes depending on the accommodative stance
3 It is often neglected in macro models that public debt and public bonds represent liabilities of the public
sector but, at the same time, they are assets and a relevant component of private sector’s wealth. A higher
public debt and large interest payments to public bonds’ holders may thus give rise to expansionary outcomes
by simply stimulating private sector consumptions through income and wealth effects. These effects are fully
accounted for by stock-flow-consistent (SFC) models such as those proposed by Godley and Lavoie (2007)
and Ryoo and Skott (2013).
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monetary policy may take in the presence of fiscal retrenchments. Although more
circumstantiated and specific, the critiques these contributions offer to the logic of the
EAT are not fully convincing. Palley (2010) and Dosi et al. (2015), for instance, assume
a simple closed economy in which, by default, EAT’s “external channel” is inoperative.
Also, they do not enter into the details of what is defined as a well-designed consol-
idation plan,4 so they neglect to consider how the composition of a fiscal contraction
may affect its own outcomes. Similarly, Foresti and Marani (2014) simplistically define
austerity as a reduction in the public deficit, thus taking for granted the debatable
capability of restrictive fiscal measures to squeeze effectively the public deficit.
Differently from previous contributions, in this paper we develop a post-Keynesian/
evolutionist model that tries to enter more into the details of EAT’s propositions. In a
way, we take a step further with respect to Dutt (2013), and make some more
concessions to orthodoxy. In particular, we more accurately model the specific com-
ponents of a well-designed austerity package (see Section 2.1 below). In addition to
that, we formally take into account all the three EAT channels through which well-
conceived austerity measures could supposedly release their (expansionary) effects. In
line with the purposes of the paper, we do this in order to show the intrinsic logical
inconsistency between EAT assumptions about public debt dynamics and its allegedly
negative effect on economic activity, and the suggested austerity measures aimed at
avoiding public debt-led macroeconomic havoc.
We frame such analysis in the context of an economy that does not operate at full
potential and does not face any supply-side constraint. Perhaps paradoxically, this
assumption is consistent with the perspective put forward by the advocates of expan-
sionary austerity. Sure, EAT’s supporters argue that well-designed fiscal adjustments
can boost economic activity through both demand and supply channels. Nonetheless,
most of their emphasis is on the demand-side channels, given their attempt to stress
their non-Keynesian perspective on the effects of fiscal policy.5 In line with this logic,
we focus on the operativeness of the demand-side levers only, and we assume an
economy in which fiscal policy may affect aggregate demand and, through this way,
current economic activity.
2.1 The model
Let us assume an open economy composed of six sectors: working households,
rentiers, (non-financial) firms, the government, commercial banks, and, ultimately,
the “Rest of the world” (RoW henceforth).
Working households earn wages (w) from non-financial firms. They consume
domestic goods (C), import foreign-made goods (XMC), and pay taxes according to
the tax rate (t). They also receive public transfers (TrG) and unemployment benefits
4 Actually, Palley (2010) and Dosi et al. (2015) identify austerity measures with simple deficit-cutting rules.
5 Alesina et al. (2015) clearly point out that a decisive aspect of successful austerity packages lies in their
capacity to stimulate private sector’s investments by fostering private sector’s confidence in the solidity of the
domestic macroeconomic environment. Such a peculiar component of (successful) expenditure-based fiscal
consolidations versus (unsuccessful) tax-based adjustments “cannot be explained by (accompanying) supply-
side reforms” (Alesina et al. 2015, p.37). It implicitly relies upon the existence of a “negative” fiscal multiplier
of aggregate demand.
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(wU ) from the government. Working households’ savings take the form of commercial
banks’ demand deposits (BD).
Rentiers receive dividends from commercial banks,6 as well as interest payments on
their holdings of foreign financial assets. For the sake of simplicity, we assume rentiers
not to consume. Rentiers use their savings in order to accumulate new foreign financial
assets according to a sort of Panama Papers–type investment fashion. New equity
issuances are not considered in the present paper.
Non-financial firms pay wages to workers and make interest payments (iHL) on the
stock of loans from commercial banks. They get revenues through workers’ consump-
tion expenditures, government purchases, exports to the RoW (XE), and domestic gross
capital formation (I). They import foreign goods in an amount equal to XMI. For the
sake of simplicity, we assume that realized profits (Π) are fully retained in order to
finance desired capital accumulation together with new loans (dL) from commercial
banks.
Commercial banks provide loans (L) to domestic firms and buy domestic govern-
ment bonds. Accordingly, they get interest payments (iHL) from domestic firms and
(iDD
H
b) from the government. Commercial banks receive deposits from households.
We assume interest rates on households’ deposits to be equal to zero. Commercial
banks’ profits are fully redistributed to rentiers.7
The government undertakes current consumption expenditures (G), import foreign
goods (XMG), and makes transfers to working households. It also levies taxes on
working households’ income (i.e. a crucial component of EAT-type austerity packages).
For the sake of simplicity, we do not include taxes on rentiers’ income or firms’ profits
(or indirect taxes) in our model. The difference between the government’s revenues and
total expenditures gives public surplus (or deficit). The public deficit is financed by
issuing new government bonds (B = dD). Both commercial banks and the RoW buy
domestic government bonds.
The RoW sells imported goods in the amount (XM) and buys exports (XE). As to
financial transactions, financial outflows are given by domestic rentiers’ accumulation
of new assets abroad. Financial inflows take the form of net purchases of new home-
government bonds by the RoW (i.e., BRoW ¼ dDHRoW ). Exchange rate fluctuations can
significantly affect both trade and financial flows. For the sake of simplicity, here we
depart from this complication and we take the nominal exchange rate as fixed. We
rather focus on real exchange rate variations that, according to EAT, can take place due
to fiscal policy-induced wage moderation and internal devaluation. In the same vein,
the mechanisms through which the balance of payments (BoP) adjusts to equilibrium
are not a major aspect of this model. Accordingly, we assume that current account
deficit (surplus) and capital account surplus (deficit) always compensate each other,
perhaps through the intervention of central banks (not explicitly model in this paper).
For example, this is the case of trade and financial relations among eurozone countries,
6 We assume rentiers to be the ultimate owners of commercial banks by holding commercial bank equities.
7 In our simple model, commercial banks do not play any active role in the definition of income distribution,
since commercial bank profits are fully distributed to rentiers. Nevertheless, they still remain a fundamental
actor since the way they determine interest rates on loans to the private sector can crucially affect how austerity
measures may affect investment demand and capacity utilization as a whole. See more on this here below.
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in which ECB’s Target-2 balance adjusts endogenously in order to ensure the equilib-
rium in the BoP.
All the economic and financial relations characterizing our economic system are
reported in the Balance sheet matrix and Transactions-flow of funds matrix reported in
Tables 1 and 2, respectively.
Let’s assume that the economy produces according to a fixed-coefficient technique.
Equation (1) defines the current level of economic activity (Y) as a function of capacity
utilization (y = Y/Y*),8 the output-capital technological coefficient β (=Y*/K), and of the
available capital stock (K).
Y ¼ Y
Y*
Y*
K
K ¼ yβK ð1Þ
Given labor productivity (α) and the total labor force (N), Eqs. (2) and (3) define the
level of unemployment (U) and the unemployment rate (u), with (δ) as the ratio of
potential output over the maximum amount of goods producible, according to labor
productivity and the available labor force.
U ¼ N−E ¼ N− Y=αð Þ ð2Þ
u ¼ N− Y=αð Þ
N
¼ 1− Y
Y*
Y*
αN
¼ 1−δy ð3Þ
As far as the labor market is concerned, we assume workers and trade unions to
target a desired real wage rate and, therefore, given labor productivity, a desired wage
share (1–τw) (“τw” being the profit share implicitly consistent with trade unions’ target).
We assume the bargaining power of trade unions to depend positively on the degree of
regulation and protection of workers in the labor market, say the generosity of
Table 1 Balance sheet matrix
Workers Rentiers Firms Commercial Banks Government RoW Σ
Capital +K +K
Deposits +BD -BD 0
Gov. bonds +Db -D +DRoW 0
Loans -L +L 0
Equities +Eb -Eb 0
Foreign Assets +FA -FA 0
Net Worth -NWH -NWR -NWF -NWB -NWG -NWRoW -K
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 Y* stands for potential output, i.e., the maximum amount of output the economy could produce by fully
utilizing the available capital stock.
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unemployment benefits (wÞ, among other factors. Accordingly, we assume (1–τw) to be
a positive function of the “labor market regulation variable” (z). Equation (4) defines
the nominal wage rate (w) bargained by trade unions on the basis of their targeted wage
share and their price expectations (Pe):
w ¼ 1−τw z w
  
Peα ð4Þ
On their side, firms target a desired profit rate (rd). Given their expectations about
the level of capacity utilization (ye) – see more on this below – they set the mark-up (m)
on variable costs and the ensuing profit share (τ) on domestic income consistently with
their goals. Equations (5) and (6) formalize firms’ behaviors as to the determination of
the domestic price (PH):
rd ¼ τ mð Þye hence m ¼ τ rd=ye −1with ∂τ=∂rd  > 0; ∂τ=∂yeð Þ < 0 ð5Þ
PH ¼ 1þ mð Þw=α ð6Þ
In our open economy, Eqs. (5) and (6), together with foreign prices (PF) and the
(given) nominal exchange rate (e), determine the real exchange rate (q) – see Eq. (7)
below:
q ¼ eP
F
PH
¼ eP
F
1þ mð Þ 1−τwð ÞPe ð7Þ
When we describe the components of aggregate demand in our model, we first
assume aggregate consumption to depend on workers’ disposable income only, where-
as rentiers save all their income. This is a highly simplifying assumption that bears
some important implications as to the inter-temporal dynamics of the public debt-to-
GDP ratio (see Section 3). Indeed, in our model, we exclude a priori any possible
expansionary effect that debt accumulation may play on aggregate consumption by
both increasing private sector’s wealth (in this model, government bonds are directly
held by commercial banks and foreigners only) and, more importantly, by increasing
rentiers’ income via higher interest payments. In the post-Keynesian models we
reviewed at the beginning of this Section, such debt-driven expansion of domestic
consumption significantly contributes to (self-) stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio. With
this caveat in mind, we adopted this assumption to maintain the model tractable and
focused on its primary goal, i.e. the formalization of the main components of a “well-
designed” EAT-type austerity plan. Furthermore, our assumption represents one of the
several concessions we make to EAT in order to reveal its intrinsic logical contradic-
tions. Indeed, we will show more clearly in Section 4 that when public debt does not
bear positive effects on economic activity and its dynamics can easily become unstable
(hence orthodoxy’s obsession for its stabilization through austerity), then the short-run
costs of austerity (in terms of economic recession and a likely initial increase in the
debt-to-GDP ratio) can hardly produce any long-run benefit.
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Equation (8) below formalizes out aggregate consumption function. Given the
saving rate (s) and the taxation rate (t), domestic consumption is a positive function
of wage billW (= wE), public transfers (TrG), and unemployment benefits wUð Þ. More
precisely, Eq. (8) defines consumption as normalized by the domestic capital stock,
with ω(=w/PH) and ω ¼ w=PH  as the real wage rate and the real unemployment
benefit (in terms of the home price PH) – with ω > ω – and ρ(=TrG/PHK):
C
PHK
¼ c0 þ 1−s teð ; TrG
 
1−tð Þ
β ω−ω
 
y
α
2
4
3
5 ð8Þ
With c0 ¼ 1−sð Þ 1−tð Þ βαδ ωþ ρ
 
; f te ¼ ∂s=∂teð Þ > 0; f TrG ¼ ∂s=∂TrG
 
< 0:
In line with the literature on expansionary austerity, in Eq. (8) we also assume that
households’ saving propensity (s) depends positively on the expected future tax rate
(te). This assumption relies upon a kind of orthodox “permanent income argument”.
Current cuts in public expenditures, if sufficiently strong and reliable, may induce
households to increase current consumption, since they may expect a lower tax burden
tomorrow. By the same token, we assume (s) to depend negatively on public transfers.
Indeed, it is reasonable to believe that a permanent cut in public transfers, perhaps due
to the decision to downsize the provisions of the welfare system (read: a less-generous
domestic pension system), can induce households to adopt a precautionary stance and
save more today in anticipation of lower public transfers tomorrow.9
Equation (9) gives public purchases, once again normalized for the existing capital
stock K, as an exogenous policy variable (γ).
G
PHK
¼ γ ð9Þ
Equation (10) defines the current growth rate of the capital stock. For the sake of
simplicity, following Taylor (2012), we assume that investment demand is purely
autonomous in the short run, in the sense that it does not depend on current capacity
utilization. We take this assumption in order to capture EAT’s emphasis on role of
economic actors’ expectations. In fact, we imagine entrepreneurs to define desired
investments according to their expectations about capacity utilization (ye).
Entrepreneurs will increase investments should they expect the economy to expand
and capacity utilization to be high. By contrast, they will scale down investment
projects if negative expectations mature about contracting economic activity. Finally,
we assume investment demand to be a negative function of the costs of external
borrowing (iL). This assumption contributes to the formalization of the
abovementioned “financial channel”. Austerity measures can possibly expand private
investments in the event they manage to downside the public deficit imbalances, and
prompt a reduction in interest rates.
9 The same logic may apply in the presence of a reduction in public benefits to unemployed people, which
makes average expected income lower.
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I
K
¼ g ye; iLð Þ with gye > 0 and giH < 0 ð10Þ
Finally, Eq. (11) describes exports (as normalized with respect to the capital
stock) to be a simple linear positive function of the real exchange rate (q).
Equation (12), in turn, assumes “normalized” imports as a linear (positive) func-
tion of domestic capacity utilization (y), with parameter (η) being a negative
function of the real exchange rate (q):
EX
PHK
¼ ϵq ð11Þ
XM
PHK
¼ η qð Þyβ with ηq ¼ ∂η=∂qð Þ < 0 ð12Þ
As to the “financial” side of the economy, let us first consider how private firms
finance desired investments. In this model, we assume that non-financial firms
retain all profits in order to fund capital accumulation. Additionally, they take
loans from commercial banks (dL) for the part of investments not covered by
internal funds. In real life, it is obviously possible that commercial banks ration
available credit so that not all investment projects are eventually financed. For the
sake of simplicity, we do not take this eventuality explicitly into account.
Nonetheless, commercial banks fix the interest rate (iL) charged on loans to non-
financial firms. In periods of financial distress, commercial banks are very likely
to increase the mark-up rate through which they determine iL (see more on this
below). By doing this, they increase the cost of external funding, and implicitly
cut the total amount of financed investment projects.
Commercial banks hold two types of assets on their balance sheet. On the one hand,
they buy domestic government bonds. On the other hand, they give loans to firms.
Government bonds are considered “relatively” safe assets. They constitute the collateral
commercial banks commonly use in refinancing operations with the central bank, even
in periods of financial turbulences in the market for sovereign bonds (see Mehrling
2011). On the contrary, loans stand out as “relatively” riskier. They are “non-shiftable”
assets that, once created, will likely remain on commercial banks’ balance sheets until
maturity, together with the corresponding risk. Accordingly, in Eq. (13) we assume
commercial banks to set the interest rate (iL) on loans to the private sector by applying a
mark-up (μ) on the interest rate (id) on government bonds.
iL ¼ 1þ μð Þid ð13Þ
The public deficit (dD) (hence new bond issuances) is given by the difference
between government’s outlays, i.e. public purchases (G), public transfers (TrG),
unemployment benefits (wU ), and debt servicing (Ψ), minus tax revenues:
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dD ¼ Gþ TrG þ wU þ Ψ−t wE þ TrG þ wU . Equation (14) below expresses the
public deficit as a ratio of current output:
b ¼ dD
Y
¼ dD
PHK
 	
PHK
Y*
 	
Y*
Y
 	
¼ ξ þ ψð Þ
βy
ð14Þ
With ξ ¼ GþTr
GþwUþΨ−t wEþTrGþwU½ 
PHK ¼ γ þ 1−tð Þ ð ρþ ω
GþTrGþwUþΨ−t wEþTrGþwU½ 
PHK Þ
− tωþ½ 1−tð Þω GþTr
GþwUþΨ−t wEþTrGþwU½ 
PHK yas the primary deficit-to-capital stock ratio,
and ψ = Ψ/PHK as the costs of debt servicing over the capital stock.
Finally, Eq. (15) formalizes how the interest rate on government bonds is determined
in financial markets. Together with Eqs. (10) and (13), it models EAT’s “financial
channel”:
id ¼ iþ σ b;Ωð Þ ð15Þ
With σ > 0 and σb = (∂σ/∂b) > 0 if Ω= 1; σ = 0 and σb = 0 if Ω= 0
According to Eq. (15), yields on bonds depend on the perceived degree of soundness
of public finances. Following De Grauwe (2011) and De Grauwe and Ji (2013), the
riskiness of government bonds also relies upon the “monetary framework” in which
government bonds are issued. Monetarily sovereign countries issue bonds denominated
in their own currency, which is under the control of the corresponding central bank.
Even more importantly, the central bank will likely intervene in financial markets any
time it wants and buy government bonds in order to prevent default risks from emerging.
As a consequence, in monetarily sovereign countries, government bonds are considered
risk-free assets, and their yields are insensitive to most economic variables, public
finance variables among others (see De Grauwe and Ji 2013). This is not the case of
eurozone countries. Eurozone governments issue bonds denominated in a foreign
supranational currency. On top of this, eurozone rules require national governments
to find resources on private financial markets only, and forbid the European Central
Bank (ECB) from buying public bonds (at least on the primary market). The solidity of
eurozone countries’ public finances is subject to the will of financial operators, who
perceive eurozone government bonds as potentially riskier assets.
Consistent with these arguments, in Eq. (15), (i) stands for the interest rate on risk-
free assets. Parameter (σ) represents a country-specific factor risk. It jointly depends on
the state of public finances, and on a country-specific bivariate “monetary framework”
variable (Ω = 0 or 1). We assume σ to depend positively on the public-deficit-to-GDP
ratio (b).10 The higher b, the higher the interest rate (id) a government has to pay on
public bonds. However, this relationship holds true only in the case of non–monetarily
sovereign economies, in which case (Ω) is equal to 1. In the case of monetarily
10 In the short-run part of the present model, we assume the interest rate (id) to be a (positive) function of the
public deficit-to-GDP ratio only, and not of the debt-to-GDP ratio. This is, of course, a simplifying assumption.
Yet, whilst it makes mathematical passages more tractable, it does not change the meaning or the results of our
analysis. This assumption will be relaxed in the long-run analysis performed in the second part of the paper.
The short- and long-run inconsistency of the expansionary austerity...
sovereign economies, Ω turns equal to 0. The positive relations between (id) and (b)
breaks down, so that σ = 0 and σb = 0. Yields on monetarily sovereign countries’
government bonds are exogenously equal to (i).
In our demand-driven model, aggregate demand determines production. Equation
(16) defines the equilibrium on the goods market:
Y ¼ C þ Gþ I þ EX−XM ð16Þ
Normalizing both sides Eq. (16) by the capital stock, plugging Eqs. (1) and (8)–(12)
into (16) and rearranging, we get the value of capacity utilization (y) that ensures
equilibrium on the goods market.
y ¼ C0 þ γ þ g y
e; iL bð Þð Þ þ ϵq
Λ
ð17Þ
With 1Λ ¼ 1β 1− 1−Sð Þ 1−tð Þa ω−ϖð Þþη½  as the Keynesian multiplier. As expected, the
Keynesian multiplier is a negative function of the saving rate (s), the tax rate (t), and
the import coefficient η(q). Also, the Keynesian multiplier increases with the real wage
rate (ω). Equation (17) simple shows that capacity utilization is a positive function of all
demand injections. In particular, it is worth noting that (y) increases with public
transfers ρ. Furthermore, higher real unemployment benefits ω have a direct positive
impact on (y) by raising (c0) (despite its direct negative effect on the Keynesian
multiplier).11 Note that the equilibrium level of capacity utilization is influenced by
the government’s public deficit (b), via its possible effects on bonds’ yields (id) (see Eq.
(15)) and, hence, (iL) and (g) – see Eqs. (13) and (10). It is also worth noting that,
according to Eq. (14), capacity utilization feeds back in the determination of the deficit-
to-GDP ratio.
2.2 The short-run macroeconomic effects of cuts in public transfers
According to the arguments presented in the previous section, we can now obtain a
system of two equations in two unknown variables (y, b) by putting together Eqs. (14)
and (17). By solving this system, we simultaneously determine the short-run equilib-
rium values of capacity utilization and deficit-to-GDP ratio. More formally:
y ¼ C0 þ γ þ g y
e; iL bð Þð Þ þ ϵq
Λ
b ¼ ξ yð Þ þ ψð Þ
βy
8><
>: ð18Þ
System (18) is at the center of our fiscal policy “exercises”.
11 The direct effect of wð Þ on (y) does not take into account the indirect impact that wð Þ may induce on
capacity utilization by affecting wage determination, hence the real exchange rate and export and import flows
(see more on this in section 2.3).
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Exercise 1 The government implements a restrictive fiscal policy such that the cycli-
cally adjusted primary deficit over GDP (b*) decreases by an amount equal to – θ (i.e.
db* = − θ and θ > 0).12 Fiscal consolidation is carried out through a cut to public
transfers (i.e., dTrG < 0). Consistent with EAT logic, as a consequence of public
transfers cut, economic actors expect a reduction in future taxes in an amount equal
to dte, with (dte < 0).
For the purpose of this exercise, we define (b*) as the primary deficit that would
emerge should output be at full capacity, i.e. Y = Y* and y = 1. According to Eq. (14), b*
is then equal to: b* ¼ 1β γ þ 1−tð Þ½ ρþ 1−δð Þð ω 1βÞ −tω 1β. According to the design of
our fiscal policy exercise, we finally get: db* ¼ −θ ¼ 1−tð Þβ dρ ¼ 1−tð Þβ dTrG, so that:
dTrG ¼ − Y*1−tð Þ θ.
Take now system (18) and totally differentiate it with respect to dTrG and dte. We
obtain:
dy ¼ 1
Λ
yTrGθþ yte dtej j þ gbdbf g
db ¼ − 1
βy
βθþ 1þ εξ;y


 

  ξ
y
dy
 
8><
>: ð19Þ
In system (19), we define yTrG ¼ f TrG c01−sð Þ 1−tð ÞY*− 1−sð Þ
h
β þ c01−sð Þ 1−tð ÞY  < 0 as the
negative effect that a cut of public transfers carries on private consumption and capacity
utilization. In turn, yte ¼ f te c01−sð Þ þ ∂Λ=∂teð Þ
h
y > 0 is the positive effect that an
expected reduction in taxation |dte| > 0 brings about current consumption and, hence,
economic activity. Finally, gb ¼ giL 1þ μð Þσb < 0 is the negative effect that an
increase in the public deficit (with respect to the GDP) would induce on private
investment by affecting interest rates (id) and (iL). In the equation for the change in
the deficit-to-GDP ratio, (εξ, y) is the (negative) elasticity of primary deficit with respect
to capacity utilization.
Equations (20) and (21) give the solutions dyS and dbS of system (19) once we make
explicit the positive/negative signs of the “partial” effects just described according to
the positive/negative variations in the policy variables (dTrG; dte) at the center of our
policy exercise:
ð20Þ
dbS ¼ − 1
βy
βθþ 1þ εξ;y


 

  ξ
y
dyS
 
ð21Þ
12 We focus on the cyclically adjusted primary balance because this is the economic variable EAT’s supporters
mostly use in order to measure the extent of discretionary fiscal policies.
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Equations (20) and (21) show that even well-designed austerity measures hardly
guarantee that austerity-led expansion will materialize, even in a theoretical framework
that makes several concessions to EAT’s orthodoxy. By the same token, there is by no
means any guarantee that well-designed austerity can effectively reduce the debt-to-
GDP ratio. More in detail:
1. The “expectation channel” can induce an expansionary effect on private consump-
tion only if dt
ej j
θ >
dtej j
θ , i.e. the expected reduction in taxation, is sufficiently large so
that it more than compensates for the contraction in private consumption due to
current and certain cuts in public transfers. Households’ expectations are crucial.
Paradoxically, it is reasonable to think that such positive expectations will hardly
materialize in an economy characterized by a high public debt, i.e. the economic
scenario in which fiscal consolidation is primarily needed according to EAT’s
supporters. When the public debt (D) is considerably high, a prolonged period of
fiscal consolidation is likely foreseen, and a high degree of uncertainty may
“surround” the extent and the timing of future tax cuts. In such a context, the
“expectation channel” is extremely weak at best, and likely overwhelmed by the
contractionary effect of cuts in public transfers.
2. Following Eqs. (13) and (15), in monetarily sovereign countries, the “financial
channel” may be irrelevant (σb = 0), so that another alleged expansionary effect of
well-designed fiscal consolidation may actually vanish.
3. The “financial channel” might be at work in the case of non-monetarily sovereign
(eurozone) countries. In such a context, one could be persuaded that front-loaded
fiscal adjustments might create a favorable environment for growth if they effec-
tively put fiscal variables under control, and reassure financial markets about the
sustainability of the fiscal stance. Yet, we are very far from taking such an outcome
of fiscal consolidation as guaranteed. Indeed, some recent empirical evidence
shows that severe fiscal retrenchments may rather induce a short-run deterioration
in fiscal variables by jeopardizing growth (see Ali Abbas et al. 2013). In terms of
our model, Eq. (21) shows that austerity measures can surely prompt a reduction in
the public deficit-to-GDP ratio only if they engineer an expansion of the economy
(i.e. dyS > 0). If this does not happen, austerity measures could still reduce the
public deficit, and ignite a virtuous financial mechanism only on the condition that
economic contraction is small, so that:
dyS


 


θ
<
β
ξ=yð Þ 1þ εξ;y


 

  ð22Þ
Should condition (22) be violated, then fiscal austerity will be self-defeating. It will
trigger a perverse “financial channel”. In fact, as a consequence of austerity, the deficit-
to-GDP ratio will initially deteriorate, interest rates increase and investment shrink
rather than take momentum. Interestingly, condition (22) is even the more binding, the
higher the elasticity of primary deficit to capacity utilization (|εξ, y|), and the higher the
initial level of the primary deficit over GDP (ξ/y). The message to policy-makers is,
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therefore, the following: in the context of non-monetarily sovereign countries, it is of
paramount importance to assess the effectiveness of austerity packages in prompting
economic expansion before implementing them. It is even more important in the case of
countries running quite large and “income-elastic” primary deficits. In these cases, even
a mild austerity-led recession may give rise to a financial and economic disaster rather
than improving macroeconomic records.
2.3 The short-run macroeconomic effects of lower unemployment benefits
Exercise 2 The government implements a cut in unemployment benefits (w) in
order to induce wage moderation and engineer an internal devaluation of the real
exchange rate.
The final goal of this policy is to improve the external competitiveness of the
economy and boost growth via rising exports and a decrease in imports. In order to
see if it is effective or not, take system (18) and differentiate it with respect to dw, dy
and db. We get:
dy ¼ 1
Λ
Γdwþ g
re;ye;w
 dwþ ϵ−βyηq qwdwþ gbdb
2
4
3
5
db ¼ 1
βy
b
w
dw− 1þ εξ;y


 

  ξ
y
dy
 
8>><
>>>:
ð23Þ
In system (23), Γ ¼ ∂c0=∂wð Þ½ −β 1−sð Þ 1−tð Þα  1−sð Þ 1−tð Þα > 0 is the direct positive
(negative) effect an increase (cut) in unemployment benefits would induce on capacity
utilization by raising households’ consumption. In the same vein, g re;ye;wð Þ stands for the
indirect effect a cut in unemployment benefits might have on investment demand (g) by
inducing a climate of wage moderation and, hence, by affecting firms’ expected profit
rate (re)13 and capacity utilization (ye). Such an effect has an uncertain sign. On the one
hand, according to EAT’s supporters, a weaker trade union bargaining position, the
redistribution of income in favor of firms, and hence higher expected profits (re) can
certainly encourage investment. On the other hand, investment’s response to a
reduction in unemployment benefits (w) and the wage rate (w) also depends on the
impact such austerity measures bring about on expected capacity utilization (ye). A
negative link between w, w and ye (i.e. a reduction in w and w induces expected
capacity utilization ye to rise) might perhaps emerge in extremely open small economies
in which a minor part of aggregate demand comes from domestic absorption (the case
of Ireland, for instance). However, such a relation likely turns out to be positive in large
13 In the present paper, in equation (10) we do not explicitly formalize any specific link between expected (or
desired) profitability and investment demand. Yet, any policy-induced one-off change in income distribution
that, ceteris paribus, may also affect firms’ profitability, can be modelled through an exogenous shift in the
investment demand function itself. This is what we assume in system (23) when we analyze the short-run
effects of a EAT-like cut in unemployment benefits and the ensuing climate of wage moderation.
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countries or in small but relatively closed economies such as Greece, in which domestic
wages represent a leading source of aggregate demand. This is even the more so if one
considers the positive link that may exist between higher wages and investment
demand due to firms’ search for new capital goods incorporating new labor-saving
technologies (Fejio and Lamonica 2013; Caiani et al. 2017). In the end, the “EAT-
friendly” profit-led nature of investment demand is all to ascertain, hence the undefined
sign associated to g re;ye;wð Þ.
14
Last but not least, in system (23) bw ¼ 1−tð Þαw 1−tð Þαw −t ∂ω=∂ωð Þ is the variation in
public deficit due to a change in unemployment benefits. If we take explicitly
into account the sign of the variations in the policy variables at stake and we
solve system (23), we get:
ð24Þ
dbS2 ¼ 1
βy
b
w
dw− 1þ εξ;y


 

  ξ
y
dyS2
 
ð25Þ
Equations (24) and (25) confirm that even a well-designed cut in unemployment
subsidies does not guarantee any success in stimulating growth (via internal devalua-
tion and the “external channel”) and/or squeezing the public deficit. In particular:
1. A reduction in w can lead, per se, to economic expansion only if ϵ−βyηq
 
qwj j
þg re;ye;wð Þ > Γ; i.e. the “external channel”, given the uncertain change in invest-
ment demand, is strong enough to outstrip the immediate reduction in private
domestic consumption. Such an eventuality strongly relies upon the sensitiveness
of net exports to the real exchange rate (parameters ϵ and ηq in Eq. (24)), which, in
turn, is conditional on the sectorial composition of net exports themselves and the
degree of openness of the economy (see Taylor 1991). Fitting our theoretical
analysis with the ongoing economic policy debate, we may say that it is highly
questionable such a policy recipe could ever be successful in a relatively closed and
largely deindustrialized small economy such as Greece.
2. As in Exercise 1, the effectiveness of cuts in unemployment benefits to trigger off a
reduction in public deficit, and thus ignite virtuous financial mechanisms, strongly
relies upon the pro-expansionary virtues of such a policy package. Point 1 already
noted how this assumption could be extremely weak at beast.
14 In standard post-Keynesian macro models à la Bhaduri and Marglin (1990), the profit-led or wage-led
nature of capital accumulation hinges upon the positive effect current capacity utilization (y) has on investment
demand, and on the simultaneous determination of the two (i.e. y and g) in the short run equilibrium. In the
present model, the positive or negative response of capital accumulation to policy-induced shifts in income
distribution depends on how a pro-profit change in income distribution alters entrepreneurs’ expected capacity
utilization (ye).
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Table 3 provides a summary of the results of the above policy experiments. It shows
the high degree of uncertainty surrounding the allegedly expansionary outcomes of
well-designed fiscal consolidation packages (see bold entries in Table 3 where dys < 0
or not defined). In particular, Table 3 shows how, in the case of non-monetary sovereign
countries, austerity packages risk to turn the “financial channel” negative (a (−) sign in
Table 3) and to accentuate financial distress if they give rise to an initial economic
contraction (due to rather weak expectation and external channels), which in turn
deteriorates the solidity of public finances (condition (22) is not fulfilled).
3 The long-run dynamics
EAT’s supporters have recently admitted that even well-designed austerity packages
can actually come with some costs. Nevertheless, they maintain there are short-run and
short-lived costs more than compensated by austerity-bred long-run benefits.
According to Warmedinger et al. (2015), “the medium-to-longer-term benefits of
well-designed fiscal consolidation are typically associated to short-term costs in the
form of output losses, [but] since sound government finances are a prerequisite for price
and macroeconomic stability and, consequently, for strengthening the conditions for
sustainable growth, the long-term benefits of achieving such goals outweigh the short-
term costs” (Warmedinger et al. 2015, p.1).
In order to assess critically such a proposition, let us move our analysis to the long-
run dynamics of the variables at stake, namely, capacity utilization (as determined by
the evolution of economic actors’ expectations) and the debt-to-GDP ratio. In this
sense, it is worth reminding that our model is rather simple. In particular, it allows us
not to take into account all the other economic and financial variables, say banks’
deposits, foreign assets, and non-financial firms’ private debt-to-GDP ratio, which also
evolve through time on top of public debt-to-GDP ratio. The evolution of the private
sector’s financial wealth is not relevant because we have excluded any wealth effect
from the determination of aggregate consumption. We also assume firms’ investment
decisions not to depend on the ratio between outstanding loans and capital stock. These
are certainly relevant assumptions that may have relevant implications for the long-run
dynamics of the model. For instance, the inclusion of any wealth effect or rentiers’
consumption propensity in the definition of aggregate consumption would certainly
help to stabilize the dynamics of the debt-to-GDP ratio. The inclusion of the private
debt-to-capital stock ratio in the determination of firms’ investments could determine a
complex interaction between the evolution of private and public debt.15 Nonetheless,
the above assumptions are functional to keep the analysis fairly simple and mathemat-
ically tractable. Furthermore, they keep our analysis focused on its main aim, i.e. a
theoretical critique of intrinsic EAT contradictions. For this purpose, our model makes
several concessions to EAT orthodoxy, in particular, its obsession about public debt
15 An explicit formalization of the interaction between public and private debt, and of the way the latter can
impact the evolution of the economy as a whole, certainly represents a central piece of a theoretical analysis of
Minskian cyclical dynamics and instability. However, such an issue is beyond the goals of the present paper.
Therefore, we preferred keeping this complication out of our theoretical model.
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instability and its negative implication for economic activity, and to concentrate on the
variables at the center of EAT argumentation.
According to EAT, expectations play a crucial role for austerity packages to
be expansionary. Despite EAT’s emphasis on economy-disruptive effects of
excessive accumulation of unstable public debt, EAT-like theoretical models
assume expectations to follow a forward-looking, perfect-foresight logic as
elaborated by fully rational agents. Such theoretical apparatus significantly
downgrades the degree of uncertainty affecting economic dynamics, since it
excludes by assumption systemic risks perhaps due to public debt default. It
also seems quite unrealistic and unable to describe the worldwide economic
scenario emerging in the aftermath of the 2007–08 financial meltdown, and the
eurozone sovereign debt crisis.
In the last decade, it may be more reasonable to think that economic decisions have
been taken in a condition of deep substantive and procedural uncertainty (Dosi and
Egidi 1991), at least in the eurozone. In such a climate of radical uncertainty, the best
economic actors could (can) do was (is) to elaborate expectations in a myopic fashion.
This is formally stated in Eq. (26), which models how non-financial firms’ expectations
evolve:
y^e ¼ ϕ y−yeð Þ ¼ ϕ y ye;λð Þ−yeð Þ ð26Þ
Non-financial firms revise their expected level of capacity utilization upward, and
hence set y^e > 0, when current capacity utilization (y) turns out to be higher than
expected. By contrast, should effective capacity utilization be lower than expected,
expectations will be adjusted downwards. Two different stability scenarios may char-
acterize the dynamics of expectations. On the one hand, a self-stabilizing adjustment
process prevails if current economic activity, via desired investments, does not overre-
act to changes in expectations. See the Mathematical Appendix on this. Alternatively,
the revision of expectations would be characterized by unstable knife-edge Harrodian
dynamics.
With respect to the short-run model described above, in Eq. (26) we intro-
duced an additional EAT-like assumption. Following Reinhart and Rogoff (2010),
we assume that, on top of a higher deficit-to-GDP ratio, an increasing debt-to-
GDP ratio (λ = D/PHY) also has a negative impact on economic activity, so that
∂ye˙
∂λ < 0
 
. In non-monetarily sovereign countries, a higher and supposedly riskier
public debt stock may negatively impact commercial banks’ balance sheets due
to decreasing prices of sovereign bonds. This may lead commercial banks to
search for higher “safety” margins on fundable projects and revise the mark-up
rate (μ) upward. Ceteris paribus, commercial banks will charge higher interest
rates (iH) on loans to the private sector. Widespread turbulences on the market
for sovereign bonds may materialize, together with a credit crunch on the market
for loans.
Equation (27) describes the dynamics of the debt-to-GDP ratio (λ). After some
mathematical passages, we get:
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D^^
PHY
 	
¼ λ^^ ¼ dD
D
−P^^H−Y^^ ¼ ξ þ ψð Þ=βy
λ
−P^^H−y^−K^^ ¼ λ^^
¼ ξ y y
eð Þ=βy yeð Þð
λ
þ ψ λð Þ=βy y
eð Þ
λ
− εy;ye y^e þ εy;iL i^^L λð Þ þ 1−εy;q
 
P^^
H
yeð Þ þ g ye; iLð Þ
n o
ð27Þ
In Eq. (27), εy;ye ¼ gyeye=y ye; iHð Þ
 
is the elasticity of current capacity utilization (y)
to the expected one (ye); εy;iH ¼ giH ih=y ye; iHð Þ is y’s elasticity to the interest rate (iL);
εy, q is y’s elasticity to the real exchange rate. For the sake of simplicity, we assume both
the nominal exchange rate (e) and foreign prices (PF) to be given. Accordingly, in Eq.
(27) the dynamics of the real exchange rate (q) boils down to the percentage variation
of domestic price level.
As to the stability properties of the debt-to-GDP ratio, it is first reasonable to think
that when firms’ expectations are more optimistic (ye), and hence current capacity
utilization (y) and investment (K^) increase, the debt-to-GDP ratio (λ) decreases and its
dynamics is stabilized. The effect that λ may display on its own dynamics is trickier.
Following Botta (2013), at relatively low levels of the debt-to-GDP ratio, a slightly
higher value of the state variable (λ) makes any additional public deficit less relevant in
percentage terms. Accordingly, in Eq. (27), D^ turns out to be smaller. However, at much
higher values of the debt stock, some of the concerns of the supporters of EAT might
materialize. On the one hand, the higher is λ, the greater will be the burden of debt
payments over GDP (ψ).16 On the other hand, i^H may respond positively to a high and
increasing debt-to-GDP ratio, due to the abovementioned intertwined dynamics be-
tween λ and the interest rate on loans to the private sector. In the end, when financial
operators start to fear, rationally or not, that λ has reached excessively high levels,
destabilizing forces may set in, passing through increasingly cumbersome repayment
commitments, and the perverse economic effects supposedly unsafe public finances
may trigger off in the form of increasing interest rates and plummeting economic
activity.17 From a graphical point of view, the locus for a constant debt-to-GDP ratio
(λ^=0) may thus take the form of a U-shaped curve. In this sense, λT stands for the
dividing threshold of the debt-to-GDP ratio, above which financial operators believe
destabilizing forces will mount. It represents the turning point after which the upward
sloping arm of the locus for (λ^=0) emerges. See the Mathematical Appendix on this.
Equations (26) and (27) jointly define an evolving economic system, in which a
variety of different economic trajectories may emerge. Figures 1 and 2 describe the
16 This effect comes both as a natural consequence of a higher debt stock, as well as a consequence of financial
operators’ assessments of the financial risks characterizing highly indebted economies. In the case of non-
monetarily sovereign countries, an increasing public debt stock can induce financial operators to raise the
country factor risk (σ), ask for higher interest rates (id), and eventually make repayment conditions more
stringent.
17 In the analysis of equation (27), we have assumed that price dynamics and the evolution of the real
exchange rate mutually compensate each other (i.e., εy,q = 1). On the one hand, higher inflation reduces the real
burden of the public debt stock. On the other, it may raise λ by appreciating q, jeopardizing net exports, and
eventually inducing a contractionary effect on current economic activity. For the sake of simplicity, we neglect
to consider explicitly the direct and indirect effects P^Hmay play on (λ^).
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economic meaningful cases in which multiple equilibria exist in in the (ye-λ) space. In
Fig. 1, we describe the case of self-stabilizing forces prevailing in shaping the dynamics
of expectations. Hence, the locus for y^e ¼ 0  slopes downward. In Fig. 2, we portray
the case for self-induced instability characterizing the dynamics of expectations.
Accordingly, the locus for y^e ¼ 0  is positively sloped. In Figs. 1 and 2, the vertical
dashed line “λmax” stands for the ceiling value of the debt-to-GDP ratio financial
operators would agree to finance before rejecting additional treasury bond issuances,
thus giving rise to sovereign debt default. Similarly, the horizontal dashed line repre-
sents the technology-bounded (highest) level expected and effective capacity utilization
can reach.
The system we describe is far away from displaying the unique and stable equilib-
rium that usually characterizes EAT-like mainstream models populated by fully rational
perfect-foresighted agents (see Bertola and Drazen 1990; Barry and Devereux 2003). In
our model, path-dependence, cumulative mechanisms, and multiple equilibria dominate
the scene. In Fig. 1, point A represents a locally stable equilibrium featuring a high level
ye
ye'hat'=0
λ 'hat'=0
A
B
C
λ maxλT
Fig. 1 Multiple equilibria in the (ye-λ) space with self-stabilizing expectations
λ
ye
ye'hat'=0
λ 'hat'=0
C
D
λ maxλ T
Fig. 2 Multiple equilibria in the (ye- λ) space with unstable expectations
A. Botta
of capacity utilization and a low debt-to-GDP ratio. Nevertheless, point B is a “per-
verse” unstable equilibrium, which combines low capacity utilization with a burden-
some debt stock. On the right-hand side of point B, worrisome cumulative mechanisms
get momentum. They can move the economy towards point C. At point C, financial
markets eventually repudiate sovereign bonds, and public debt default takes place,
causing a collapse in economic activity.
Such destabilizing forces are even stronger in Fig. 3. In this case, despite a relatively
low debt-to-GDP level, even point A shows saddle-path instability. In the absence of
perfect-foresighted and optimizing agents, even a small deviation from point A triggers
off a diverging dynamics. In an optimistic scenario, booming economic activity could
go hand-in-hand with a monotonically decreasing debt stock. Alternatively, the econ-
omy may embark on a far more worrisome path, along which collapsing expectations
and economic activity mutually feedback into a mounting and unsustainable debt
burden, eventually leading to a bankruptcy of the public sector.
3.1 Short-run costs with long-run benefits? The intrinsic long-run inconsistency
of EAT
The economic scenarios portrayed in Figs. 1 and 2 well describe orthodoxy’s concern
about the accumulation of a too high public debt stock. Here comes our critique to EAT
logic. Due to the very same concessions done to EAT orthodoxy, our model shows that
austerity-led short-term costs (recession and an initial increase in debt-to-GDP ratio)
cannot breed any long-run benefit. Short-run costs are intrinsically at odds with long-
run improvements.
In order to see this, let us assume that the government implements a well-designed
austerity package, which induces a modest recession in the short run and an initial
deterioration in fiscal variables. In Fig. 3, such a contractionary fiscal policy shock
shifts the isocline for λ^ ¼ 0
 
upward. Ceteris paribus, expected capacity utilization
must increase in order to stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio. At the same time, the isocline
for (y^e ¼ 0Þ moves downward. The negative effect that a contractionary fiscal shock
λ
ye
ye'hat'=0
λ 'hat'=0
A
B
C
y=1
λ max
A2
B2
λ T
Fig. 3 Long-run outcomes of austerity-led short-run recessions in a stable dynamic scenario
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bears on expectations’ dynamics (via a reduction in current economic activity) must be
compensated by a lower expected level of capacity utilization (since, in this scenario,
expected capacity utilization has a self-stabilizing effect on its own dynamics). In Fig.
3, should the economy be initially located at equilibrium point A, it will eventually end
up at equilibrium A2, featuring both depressed expected and effective economic activity
(at least with respect to that associated with the initial equilibrium), and an increased
debt burden. Even more worrisomely, should the economy be located in equilibrium B,
an endless crisis and a mounting unsustainable debt stock eventually bring the economy
towards an inevitable default (point B2 in Fig. 3). Indeed, due to the short-run
contractionary outcome of fiscal austerity, point B does not constitute an equilibrium
any longer. More than this, given the initial location of the economy on the unstable
arm of the locus for λ^ ¼ 0
 
, short-run austerity-led economic contraction sets in
destabilizing dynamics. Entrepreneurs’ expectations are revised downwards, making
the recession deeper and the debt-to-GDP ratio increase. The rise in the debt-to-GDP
ratio feed backs negatively on economic activity and positively on its own dynamics.
Whilst economic expectations and current capacity utilization shrinks continuously, the
debt-to-GDP ratio rises until the threshold level λmax is reached. At this point, financial
operators repudiate public bonds and default takes place.
Such undesirable long-run outcomes of short-term austerity-led contractions
arise even more easily in the radically unstable macroeconomic environment
described in Fig. 4. In such a scenario, long-run instability would emerge even
with an economy originally located at the apparently safe low-debt equilibrium
point, A. Due to economic actors’ expectations overreacting to fiscal policy
shocks, even a slight upward shift in the isoclines for constant values of λ and
ye (see Fig. 4)18 will eventually induce a permanent contraction in economic
activity and an unsustainable public-debt-to-GDP ratio.
18 Due to the positive feedback ye now carries out on its own dynamics, an increase in ye (an upward shift in
the locus for ye˙= 0) is required to compensate for the austerity-induced contraction in y and to keep ye˙= 0.
λ
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Fig. 4 Long-run outcomes of austerity-led short-run recession in an unstable dynamic scenario
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More generally, the economy we describe may display explosive cumulative
dynamics. This is the case of the debt-to-GDP ratio when government bonds are
issued by non–monetarily sovereign countries; public debt sustainability is in the
hands of financial market operators, and λ eventually exceeds the stability thresh-
olds financial operators have adopted as a shared but fragile convention. These
non-linear, possibly cumulative dynamics are the source of path-dependence and
multiple trajectories. A common aspect of these trajectories is that short-run
austerity-led costs cause even larger pains (and no benefits) in the long run.
This is why “a radical solution for high debt is [may be] to do nothing at all—
[and] just live with it” (Ostry and Ghosh 2015), at least when we come to consider
tough fiscal retrenchments as an option for tackling it. Accordingly, EAT claims
that short-run austerity-led costs can come with long-run benefits is intrinsically
inconsistent, due to the very same mechanisms and dynamics at the base of EAT
orthodoxy. Austerity must be expansionary in the short run to pay off in the long
run. Unfortunately, we have seen at length how the former events (i.e., short-run
austerity-led expansions) are very unlikely to happen.
3.2 The case for endogenous monetary institutions
In our model, country-specific institutions contribute to determining the short- and
long-run outcomes of fiscal shocks. The specific rules guiding central bank flexibility
in purchasing government bonds and taking action against financial distress crucially
modify how austerity may affect economic activity, and the evolution of public deficit
and debt.
In the short run, the degree of monetary sovereignty of an economy contributes to
defining the active channels through which fiscal consolidation might deliver expan-
sionary outcomes. In monetarily sovereign countries, the central bank can easily buy
government bonds in order to backstop any extraordinary fiscal effort against economic
and financial crises. Accordingly, the “financial channel” is likely irrelevant. The
“financial channel” may be operative in non–monetarily sovereign countries.
However, its effectiveness is contingent upon the highly debatable capacity of austerity
measures to prompt economic expansions and to squeeze the public deficit (and debt)
from the very beginning.
The degree of monetary sovereignty can fundamentally alter the long-run stability of
the economy. In monetarily sovereign countries, the domestic central bank can neutral-
ize the negative effects that an increasing debt-to-GDP ratio may have on the economy
through its active intervention on financial markets. In monetarily sovereign countries,
monetary authorities can effectively eliminate, or at least tame, the destabilizing forces
that a fast-rising public debt stock may bear on its own dynamics via ψ and i^H (see Eq.
(27)). From a graphical point of view (see Fig. 1), this amounts to removing the upward
sloping part of the locus for λ^ ¼ 0
 
, or at least making it emerge at a far higher λT
value, and with a much flatter slope. Full monetary sovereignty can significantly expand
the “safe” stability zone surrounding point A in Fig. 1. By the same token, the lack of
monetary sovereignty constitutes a fundamental source of financial fragility, as eurozone
experience in the last decade has vividly showed.
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In this model, we presented such an institutional dichotomy as exogenously given,
and captured by the binary time-invariant parameter (Ω). Nonetheless, the events taking
place in the eurozone since 2012 demonstrate that institutions, monetary institutions
among them, can co-evolve through time together with “pure” economic variables.
The 2007–08 financial crisis initially emerged as an external shock to euro countries.
Due to the peculiar features or, better, the shortcomings of the eurozone institutional
building, a private debt crisis then evolved into a sovereign debt crisis. The increasing
risk of a eurozone suicide eventually led the ECB to pursue a gradual and partial, yet
important, drift towards an embryonic (and path-dependent) form of monetary sover-
eignty.19 Mario Draghi’s “whatever it takes” statement and the launch of the outright
monetary transactions (OMT) program, may constitute good examples of endogenous
institutional changes (Lordon 1997) inspired by the intrinsic dynamics of the system,
and by the very same economic issues they aim to tackle.
The effects of such a change are well known. Since mid-2012, hikes in the interest
rates of sovereign bonds issued by peripheral eurozone countries have disappeared, and
financial operators have stopped obsessively scrutinizing the solidity of public finances
of peripheral countries. Figure 5 portrays the stabilizing forces sparked in the eurozone
by such endogenous institutional changes.
Let us assume that the worldwide “Great Recession” and the rescue packages of
domestic financial institutions cause public deficits and public debts to rise suddenly.
Let us also assume that the debt-to-GDP ratio overcome the “stability threshold” λT. In
the absence of any significant change, financial turbulences would mount and the
public sector be on the verge of bankruptcy. The extraordinary measures taken by the
ECB board at the height of the crisis represent the endogenous institutional response to
such an apparently inevitable end. In Fig. 5, the upward-sloping arm of the locus for
19 Path dependency here consists in the peculiar institutional arrangements the euro system adopted in 2012 in
order to definitively snap-off financial turbulences given the legal and political constraints to ECB’s actions
and the lack of a centralized eurozone fiscal authority.
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Fig. 5 Stabilizing macroeconomic effects of monetary sovereignty
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λ^ ¼ 0
 
moves downward and changes slope. The isocline for constant values of the
debt-to-GDP ratio (λ) is transformed into a prevalently downward-sloping locus. Point
B shifts to point B1, and the destabilizing forces on the right of point B are inverted into
stabilizing ones (see newly emerging dotted arrows). Peripheral eurozone countries that
were reining against a seemingly unavoidable default can now rejoin stability, and
gradually converge back to point A.
4 Conclusions
An increasing body of orthodox analyses admits that front-loaded fiscal retrenchments
can likely cause an economic recession and an increasing debt-to-GDP ratio (Gros
2012; Ali Abbas et al. 2013; Warmedinger et al. 2015) in the short run. Nonetheless,
this literature also maintains that recession and an initially rising debt-to-GDP ratio are
necessary short-run costs in order to reap much higher benefits in the long run. In this
paper, we show how this proposition is theoretically inconsistent. In a post-Keynesian/
evolutionist model that makes several concessions to EAT logic, we show how these
very same concessions to orthodoxy require austerity to be expansionary and to reduce
public debt from the very beginning in order to pay off in the long run. However, such
an expansionary outcome of supposedly well-designed austerity packages is highly
uncertain from a theoretical point of view. In the end, there are good theoretical reasons
to believe that even well-designed fiscal consolidations may likely be self-defeating.
In light of these findings, the right policy recipe against sovereign debt crisis, and the
right timing for implementing it, looks radically different from what has effectively
been done so far. In the case of highly indebted non–monetarily sovereign economies
such as Greece, macroeconomic stability and growth can be primarily achieved through
significant debt relief. Instead of waiting, as the ECB did before intervening in July of
2012, monetary institutions should take immediate and decisive action to strike finan-
cial speculation and to neutralize the mounting debt crisis. This would give national
governments more space for gradually maneuvering to less painful reform of their
economies in a more stable environment. Only subsequently could some mild austerity
measures be considered in those (few) countries dealing with some problems of fiscal
profligacy.
Following Eichengreen and Panizza (2014), adjustment programs that are too
ambitious and prolonged are hardly implementable. They also fail to recognize that
significant reductions in the debt burden have historically occurred during periods of
high growth. If growth is the main way out of the crisis, and one does not want to
consider expansionary fiscal policies openly, attention should at least focus on public
support for policies related to industry, innovation, and investment. Public investment
banks, if not governments directly, may turn out to be decisive actors to prompt a
sustained and sustainable recovery.
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Mathematical Appendix
Equations (26) and (27) form a system of two dynamic equations, the stability
properties of which can be analyzed by taking partial derivatives of both equations
with respect to (ye) and (λ) in correspondence to the steady state (i.e. when (ye˙ ¼ 0Þ and
ðλ˙ ¼ 0)). Take Eq. (26) first. We have:
B ¼ ye˙ ¼ ϕye y ye;λð Þ−yeð Þ
By taking the above expression in the steady state, totally differentiating it with
respect to (ye) and (λ), and taking partial derivatives, we have:
dy˙
e ¼ ϕyLR gye
Λ
−1
 
dye þ ϕyLRgλ
Λ
dλ ¼ 0 ð28Þ
With
gye
Λ > 0 and
gλ
Λ < 0.
Rearranging Eq. (28) a bit, we get:
dye
dλ





y˙ e¼0
¼ −
gλ
Λ
gye
Λ
−1
  ð29Þ
The sign of Eq. (29) can be negative or positive depending on the sign of the
denominator. Should
gye
Λ be lower than 1 and the denominator of Eq. (29) negative
(current capacity utilization does not overact to changes in expectations), then the slope
of the geometric locus for constant values of expected and current capacity utilization is
negative. Should
gye
Λ be larger than 1 and the denominator of Eq. (29) positive (current
capacity utilization overacts to changes in expectations in a Harrodian fashion), then the
slope of the geometric locus for ye = y and (ye˙ ¼ 0Þ gets positive.
When we move to Eq. (27), after assuming that εy, q = 1, we get:
λ˙ ¼ λH ¼ λ ξ y y
eð Þ=βyð yeð Þ
λ
þ ψ λð Þ=βy y
eð Þ
λ
− εy;ye y^e þ εy;iL i^^L λð Þ þ g ye; iLð Þ
  
(With) H ¼ ξðy yeð Þ=βy yeð Þλ þ ξðy y
eð Þ=βy yeð Þ
λ − εy;ye y^e þ εy;iL i^L λð Þ þ g ye; iLð Þ
 n o
Imposing equilibrium and evaluating partial derivatives at the steady state, we get:
dλ˙ ¼ λLR∂H
∂λ





λ˙ ¼0
dλþ λLR∂H
∂ye





λ˙¼0
dye ð30Þ
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With:
∂H
∂λ





λ˙¼0
¼ − ξ=βy
λLR
 2
þ ∂ψ=∂λð Þλ
LR−ψ
βy λLR
 2 −εy;yeϕyLR gλ=Λð Þ−εy;iL ∂^i^L=∂λ −giL ∂iL=∂λð Þ ð31Þ
And
∂H
∂ye





λ˙¼0

¼ ∂ξ=∂yð Þβy− ξ þ ψð Þβ½  ∂y=∂y
eð Þ
λLR βyð Þ2 −gye−εy;y
eϕyLR
gye
Λ
−1
 
ð32Þ
It is reasonable to assume that ∂ψ=∂λð Þ ; ∂i^L=∂λ
 
and (∂iL/∂λ) are always positive
but small and close to zero when λ⟶ 0. Instead, they may considerably rise when the
debt-to-GDP ratio increases to what economic agents may consider as too high and
perhaps unsustainable levels. Accordingly, we get:
lim
λ→0
∂λ˙
∂λ





λ˙¼0
¼ − ξ=βy
λLR
þ ∂ψ=∂λð Þ
βy
−
ψ
λLR
−λLR εy;yeϕyLR gλ=Λð Þ þ εy;iL ∂^i^L=∂λ
 þ giL ∂iL=∂λð Þ  ¼ −∞
lim
λ→∞
∂λ˙
∂λ





λ˙¼0
¼ − ξ=βy
λLR
þ ∂ψ=∂λð Þ
βy
−
ψ
λLR
−λLR εy;yeϕyLR gλ=Λð Þ þ εy;iL ∂^i^L=∂λ
 þ giL ∂iL=∂λð Þ  ¼ ∞
It is also reasonable to think that the sign of Eq. (32), and hence of ∂λ˙∂ye




λ˙¼0
, is
negative. An increase in expected capacity utilization stabilizes the debt-to-GDP ratio
by expanding current economic activity and boosting the growth rate of capital stock.20
All in all, we deal with a U-shaped locus for constant values of the debt to GDP ratio,
with a minimum point at λT:
20 In equation (32),
gye
Λ −1
 
may well be negative under the scenario in which a self-stabilizing dynamics
describes time variations of expected capacity utilization. Accordingly, an increase in ye might have a partial
positive effect on the dynamics of the debt-to-GDP ratio. This fact notwithstanding, it is unreasonable to think
such a positive effect might outstrip the negative ones described in the main text, so that ∂λ˙=∂yeð Þjλ˙¼0 likely
remains negative.
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∂λ˙
∂λ





λ˙¼0 and λ¼λT
¼ εy;yeϕyLR gλ=Λj j þ εy;iL


 

 ∂^i^L=∂λT þ giL

 

 ∂iL=∂λT þ ∂ψ=∂λT
 
βy
" #
−
ξ=βy
λT
þ ψ λ
T 
λT
" #
¼ 0
In such a context, multiple equilibria emerge when ye λT
 
: λ˙ ¼ 0≤ye λT  : ye˙ ¼ 0,
and
gye
Λ −1
 
≠0. Many different dynamics emerge depending on how expected capacity
utilization feeds back into its own dynamics.
1. Self-stabilizing dynamics in the evolution of expected capacity utilization, i.e.
gye
Λ < 1.
According to Fig. 1, two long-run equilibria exist with different stability properties.
On the on hand, equilibrium A is characterized by the Jacobian matrix JA reported
below:
JA ¼
∂y˙e
∂ye





y˙e¼0
−
∂y˙e
∂λ





y˙e¼0
−
∂λ˙
∂ye





λ˙¼0−
∂λ˙
∂λ





λ˙¼0−
2
666664
3
777775
All four entries in matrix JA have a negative sign. The trace tr.(JA) is surely negative.
Equilibrium Awill be locally stable if det.(JA) > 0. Mathematically, we have:
det.(JA) = ∂y
e˙
∂ye
∂ye˙
∂ye −
∂ye˙
∂ye
∂ye˙
∂ye > 0, i.e.
∂ye˙
∂ye
∂ye˙
∂ye >
∂ye˙
∂ye
∂ye˙
∂ye. Taking the absolute value of the
partial derivatives included in the Jacobian matrix JA and rearranging, we get:
det.(JA) > 0 if ∂λ
˙ =∂λð Þj j
∂λ˙=∂yeð Þj j >
∂λ˙=∂λð Þj j
∂λ˙=∂yeð Þj j, i.e. the locus for a constant debt-to-GDP ratio is
steeper (in absolute value) with respect to the locus for a constant expected capacity
utilization. In Fig. 1, equilibrium A satisfies these conditions, so that it stands out as
locally stable.
Jacobian matrix JB determines the dynamics in the neighborhood of equilibrium B:
JB ¼
∂y˙e
∂ye





y˙e¼0
−
∂y˙e
∂λ





y˙e¼0
−
∂λ˙
∂ye





λ˙¼0−
∂λ˙
∂λ





λ˙¼0þ
2
666664
3
777775
In the Jacobian matrix JB, ∂λ˙=∂λð Þjλ˙¼0 becomes positive so that det.(JB) < 0, and
saddle-path instability emerges.
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2. Explosive dynamics in the evolution of expected capacity utilization, i.e.
gye
Λ > 1.
Figure 2 portrays the case of destabilizing forces driving the dynamics of expected
capacity utilization (i.e. the locus for (ye = y) is upward sloped). Again, multiple
equilibria may emerge with different stability properties. The Jacobian matrix JC
determines economy’s dynamics in the neighborhood of equilibrium C:
JC ¼
∂y˙e
∂ye
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λ˙¼0−
2
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3
777775
It is easy to see that the det.(JC) is certainly negative, since − ∂λ
˙ =∂λð Þ
∂λ˙=∂yeð Þ < −
∂λ˙=∂λð Þ
∂λ˙=∂yeð Þ.
Accordingly, two eigenvalues exist with opposite signs, and saddle-path instability
characterizes equilibrium C.
Last but not least, the Jacobian matrix JD is associated to equilibrium D in Fig. 2:
JD ¼
∂y˙e
∂ye





y˙e¼0
þ
∂y˙e
∂λ





y˙e¼0
−
∂λ˙
∂ye





λ˙¼0−
∂λ˙
∂λ





λ˙¼0þ
2
6666664
3
7777775
In this case, both trace tr.(JD) and determinant det.(JD) are positive, since that tr:
JD
  ¼ ∂ye˙∂ye þ ∂ye˙∂ye > 0 and − ∂λ˙=∂λð Þ∂λ˙=∂yeð Þ > − ∂λ˙ =∂λð Þ∂λ˙=∂yeð Þ (i.e. det.(JD) > 0). It is clear that radical
instability emerges in the neighborhood of equilibrium D.
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